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THE ALLEN BRADLEY DOCTRINE: AN
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING
POLICIES
HERBERT N. BERNHARDT t
Recent developments indicate an increased concern on the part
of the public, the legal profession, and law enforcement agencies in
the antitrust prosecution of labor unions.' These developments again
raise the question of what part, if any, the antitrust laws are to play in
the regulation of labor relations.
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers2 is the
landmark case on the scope of the application of antitrust laws to labor
unions. Its doctrine is an accommodation of the conflicting policies
of the antitrust laws, which discourage the growth of economic power
among commercial interests, and the labor laws, which encourage the
expansion of labor union economic power.
The labor exemption to the antitrust laws, allowing unions to
undertake activities which would violate the antitrust laws if under-
taken by employers, was the initial congressional accommodation of
these conflicting policies3 Allen Bradley spotted a flaw in this accom-
modation, i.e., the combination of employers with unions to use the
labor exemption as a shield for management's illegitimate schemes. In
formulating a theory to correct this defect, Allen Bradley and subse-
quent cases were faced with the problem of distinguishing between
legitimate labor agreements which incidentally benefit some employers
and situations in which the labor exemption is used by employers as
a shield. Now, more than sixteen years after the Allen Bradley deci-
sion, there is still the widest possible disagreement on the meaning and
applicability of its doctrine.
Accordingly, the main thrust of this Article will be an explora-
tion of the content of the Allen Bradley doctrine-to harmonize what
t Teaching and Research Associate, Rutgers University Law School. B.S. 1956,
Cornell University; LL.B. 1961, Yale University.
1 The National Debate topic is Resolved that Labor Organizations Should Be
Under the Jurisdiction of Antitrust Legislation. The Association of American Law
Schools at its recent convention devoted one of its round tables to the subject, Labor
Unions and the Antitrust Laws. The Antitrust Division has presently in litigation
or prosecuted to judgment within the past year no less than eight cases involving
unions, not to mention many cases brought by private parties and the Federal Trade
Commission.
2325 U.S. 797 (1945).
3 See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
(1094)
THE ALLEN BRADLEY DOCTRINE
at first seem to be the conflicting pronouncements of the cases already
decided and to extrapolate from those cases guidelines for the future
development of the doctrine.
I. PRE-Allen Bradley HISTORY
From the point of view of labor unions, the period before the
passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act may be looked upon as one
long era of judicial anti-unionism. Common law doctrines were used
to enjoin strikes and boycotts Attempts by state legislatures to limit
these doctrines were often so narrowly interpreted as to leave the law
unchanged.5 The first federal antitrust legislation, the Sherman Act,
was almost immediately applied to labor unions.' The Sherman Act
cases were followed within a few years by the labor exemption pro-
visions of the Clayton Act, but the exemptions were strictly inter-
preted, leaving unions still subject to antitrust prosecution in many
important situations.7 In 1930, however, Congress passed the Norris-
La Guardia Act which broadly defined labor disputes, expanded the
exemption, and repudiated much judge-made labor law.8 The years
following saw the large-scale growth of industrywide "international"
unions.
The scope of the new labor exemption was considered in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader' and United States v. Hutcheson.'0  In the
Apex case, the union activity had a substantial effect upon shipments
in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the Court held that not all re-
straints upon the flow of goods were covered by the Sherman Act; to
be within the purview of that act a restraint must have a substantial
effect upon the market forces which determine the competitive price
of the goods involved." Since the restraint imposed by the union was
not of sufficient magnitude to affect the price of hosiery, there was no
violation of the Sherman Act.
4 See MATHEVS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 635 (1954).
5 See, e.g., Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881 (Ch.
1894); People ex rel. Gill v. Smith, 5 N.Y. Crim. 509 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1887),
aff'd sub nor. People ex rel. Gill v. Walsh, 6 N.Y. Crim. 292 (Sup. Ct. Gen. Term),
aff'd tem., 110 N.Y. 633, 17 N.E. 871 (1888); Brace Bros. v. Evans, 5 Pa. County
Ct. 163 (1888).
i Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
7 E.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Alco Zande
Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
8 Norris-La Guardia Act § 13(a), 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1958).
See Note, 70 Y.A.E L.J. 70, 73-76 (1960).
9310 U.S. 469 (1940). The Apex opinion does not expressly overrule previous
interpretations of the labor exemption provisions of the Clayton Act, but it does
reflect the new attitude.
10312 U.S. 219 (1941).
-11310 U.S. at 512-13.
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The Hutcheson case involved a jurisdictional dispute in which the
union resorted to strike, picketing, and secondary boycott. Although
the decision might have been based on the Apex rule, the Court chose
much broader grounds, stating the scope of the new labor exemption
in the following terms:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not com-
bine with non-labor groups, the licit and illicit under § 20
[Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment
regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrong-
ness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the
particular union activities are the means.'
Two subsequent per curiam opinions by the Court cast further
light on this expansive reading of the labor exemption. In United
States v. International Hod Carriers Council,"3 the union had at-
tempted to force employers to refrain from using laborsaving devices;
in United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians,'4 the union had,
with the forced cooperation of certain radio stations, attempted to
eliminate all music of nonunion musicians as well as all recorded and
transcribed music from the airwaves. In both instances the dismissal
of antitrust prosecutions was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
These cases established two basic principles. First, unions acting
alone and in their own self-interest are not subject to antitrust prosecu-
tion, even if the restriction they impose has an important effect upon
the volume and type of goods moving in commerce. 5 Second, unions,
at least in some cases, can enlist the aid of business interests to further
the interests of their membership.
II. THE Allen Bradley CASE
Allen Bradley was the first case to deal with the reference in
Hutcheson to a union combining with nonlabor groups. The union
signed agreements with electrical contractors obligating them to buy
equipment only from local manufacturers under contract with the
union. It also signed agreements with the electrical manufacturers re-
12 312 U.S. at 232.
'3 313 U.S. 539, affirming United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.
1941).
14318 U.S. 741 (1943), affirming 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
15 The decision of the district court in American Fedn of Musicians was based
on the Hutcheson case and the opinion did not deny that there was a substantial
restraint upon commerce. The Hod Carriers decision by the district court, based as
it was on Apex, might seem to deny a substantial effect on commerce. Even by union
admission, however, the volume of shipment of the devices into Chicago was reduced,
and the case was decided on the basis of a demurrer to the government indictment
which charged that the labor-saving devices in question had been eliminated from
the Chicago market.
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quiring them to deal only with union contractors. Gradually the
system of bipartite agreements expanded into a tripartite conspiracy
to control prices and insulate the market from outside competition. 16
In considering the antitrust implications of this arrangement the
Court found it necessary to reconcile two declared congressional
policies:
The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy;
the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better
its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining.
We must determine here how far Congress intended activi-
ties under one of these policies to neutralize the results en-
visioned by the other.17
The Court assumed that the union agreements with the manufacturers
and contractors would have been unobjectionable standing alone. In
this case, however, the collective agreements were part of a larger pro-
gram in which the union, contractors, and manufacturers had con-
spired to monopolize business in the area. Under such circumstances
the Court refused to apply the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-
La Guardia Acts,'" reasoning that "if business groups, by combining
with labor unions, can fix prices and divide up markets, it was little
more than a futile gesture for Congress to prohibit price fixing by
business groups themselves." "9
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE Allen Bradley DOCTRINE
Decisions since Allen Bradley have done little to clarify the import
of the doctrine. Attorneys drawing up complaints under it have been
encouraged to assert a broad range of allegations, and the facts are
usually sufficiently ambiguous to prevent the dismissal of any of them.
Presented with such a barrage of charges, the courts have usually
failed to handle the problem with precision. Instead, the issue is gen-
erally posed so as to state the conclusion; the formulation in Anderson-
Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son " is typical:
16325 U.S. at 800.
17 Id. at 806.
18 Id. at 809.
19 Id. at 810.
:20 98 F. Supp. 75, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Union,
274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960); Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F2d
46, 55 (8th Cir. 1958) ; California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957).
Most decisions under the doctrine were made prior to trial, purely on the basis of
the allegations. See United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954) ;
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) ; United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. United States, 331 U.S. 395 (1947); United States v. Hamilton Glass
Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Even when the case went to trial, however,
the results often failed to supply any precise criteria. See Adams Dairy Co. v. St.
1962]
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It would seem that immunity from injunctive action is de-
pendent upon a factual determination. If there is conspira-
torial action as proscribed by the Allen Bradley case, it would
not be protected by the Norris-La Guardia or Clayton Acts.
On the other hand, if it be found that the union was acting in
its own self-interest and for the betterment of its members,
free and independent of a combination with non-labor groups
intent upon violating the anti-monopoly laws, it would be
immunized against injunctive action.
The failure of the courts to delineate exact bases of decision has
permitted advocates and commentators to adopt a wide variety of posi-
tions by selecting particular language from the opinions. Those who
favor broad application of the antitrust laws to unions argue for an
expansive reading of Allen Bradley: that once a union combines with
business groups, it will be subject to antitrust prosecution. While two
district court cases " lend support to this interpretation, the courts have
generally rejected this contention either on the theory that there must
be an employer benefit or because some undefined further element is
required.
A less extreme position is that an employer-union agreement is
subject to prosecution on the same basis as an employer conspiracy
Louis Dairy Co., supra, involving an allegation of conspiracy based upon an industry-
wide agreement that set higher piece rates on St. Louis dairy routes delivering more
than 40,000 units. Adams, the only dairy making deliveries of over 40,000 units,
charged that the purpose of the wage rate was to eliminate his cut-rate business.
The jury was charged that if the defendant dairies had signed the agreement without
any understanding, tacit or expressed, that Adams' business was to be hurt thereby,
there was no violation. The jury found for defendant dairy companies and union.
The court's characterization of the significance of the verdict, 260 F.2d at 55, was:
"Implicit in the jury's finding of no conspiracy among the appellees, is a determination
that the union did not conspire with non-labor groups that, as a matter of fact the
union acted alone in seeking legitimate labor objectives." This statement implies
that the jury had determined that the union had never discussed its demands with
business groups yet clearly it had at the bargaining table. Id. at 50-51. The point
is that this kind of getting together is not categorized by the court as "conspiring,"
but why it is not is never made explicit. See text accompanying notes 40-47 infra
for a possible explanation of the unenunciated reasoning behind the court's position
in this and similar cases.
Actually, however, a case involving a jury verdict probably poses the least
doctrinal confusion, since some decision as to what constitutes a violation must be
made in presenting the matter to the jury. In most of the nonjury cases not only is
it unclear why certain facts involve a violation, but it is not even clear which facts
constitute a violation. A particularly clear illustration of how the judges' factfinding
process may obviate the necessity for precise conclusions of law is United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, supra, in which the facts as alleged involved a clear
violation, but the facts as ultimately found involved clearly protected activity. See
347 U.S. at 188, 190; 138 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
21United States v. Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957);
United States v. Milk Drivers Union, 153 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1957). Note that
even in these cases, although the opinions do not emphasize it, there was substantial
benefit to the employers.
22 See Greenstein v. National Shirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959), appeal dimissed, 274 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1960); Pevely Dairy Co. v.
Milk Wagon Drivers Local, 174 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Mo. 1959), appeal dimnissed,
283 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1960) ; cases cited note 20 supra.
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whenever some benefit to some or all of the employers can be found.m
There are a number of ambiguous cases which may be interpreted to
hold that while some employer benefit is necessary, even employer bene-
fit incidental to maintaining union standards is enough to bring the
case within Allen Bradley. 4
The most extreme pro-union position propounded is that the Allen
Bradley doctrine applies only when the employer instigates the con-
spiracy for his own benefit and the union merely "aids and abets" the
business interest. While this interpretation ignores the facts of the
Allen Bradley case, 5 it is supported by language in the opinion of the
Supreme Court and that of the court of appeals on remand.2" In
California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n," the hearing examiner inter-
preted the Allen Bradley opinion as indicating that the union was only
ancillary to an employer conspiracy. Professor Cox states that since
2 3 Attorneys connected with the Antitrust Division took this position in interviews
I had with them in New York during the period August 1960-January 1961.
2 4 Both Anderson-Friberg Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son, 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951), and United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947),
involved attempts to eliminate low wage competition, and seem to indicate that such
restrictions may involve violations of the Sherman Act. The better interpretation,
however, is that these cases were allowed to go to trial because the restrictions could
have gone beyond merely eliminating low wage competition. Thus, the court in
Anderson-Friberg stated that if the union was acting "free and independent of a com-
bination with non-labor groups intent upon violating the anti-monopoly laws, it would
be immunized against injunctive action." 98 F. Supp. at 82. An employer group
could hardly be said to be "intent upon violating the anti-monopoly laws" if all it
asked from the union was to be protected from competition based upon labor standards
lower than those to which it was agreeing. A court of appeals opinion in the Car-
penters case indicates that it was alleged that the restrictions were used to eliminate
not merely low wage competition, but all competition from outside the San Francisco
area. Lumber Products Ass'n v. United States, 144 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1944).
In Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960), the only employer benefit alleged was protection
from a new technological technique for those who could not afford it, a benefit which
probably could have been alleged in the Hod Carriers case, or in any case in which
the union attempted to limit the introduction of new machinery in order to protect
the jobs of its members. The court of appeals indicated, however, that at trial, a
lower court might investigate the reasons for the restrictions. Perhaps this indicates
that if the restriction is genuinely in the union interest and not a quid pro quo offered
to the employers for other reasons, the case will be held to be outside Allen Bradley.
25 In most of the cases in which a violative union-management conspiracy was
found, it seems likely that the union was the instigator of the conspiracy. See Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, supra note 24; United States v. Employing
Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954). The Allen Bradley case is strongest on this
point since it states unequivocally that the union started the conspiracy. The other
opinions might be interpreted as indicating that the jury might infer that the con-
spiracy was instigated by the employer.
26 The Supreme Court in Allen Bradley posed the question as whether the unions
had lost their immunity from antitrust prosecution by aiding and abetting a management
conspiracy. Most of the opinion speaks in terms of preventing the use of the union
exemption as a shield for management conspiracies. The court of appeals empha-
sized this language when it reviewed the district court opinion on remand, and criti-
cized the district court for its excessive concern with who benefited from the con-
spiracy and for missing "the real thought which the Supreme Court expressed when
it condemned the actions of the union in endeavoring to 'aid and abet business men
who are violating the Act." 164 F2d at 74.
27 54 F.T.C. 835, 839 (1957).
19,2]
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"a union does not violate the antitrust laws by negotiating parallel re-
strictive agreements with competing business firms . . , an associa-
tion of employers which bargains as a unit ought to have the same
privilege . . . . "I
Another position which favors the unions is that Allen Bradley
applies only where the conspiracy is concerned directly with price fix-
ing and other product market controls. This theory is supported by
the many references in the Allen Bradley opinion to the importance of
direct price fixing and production controls. Nor are subsequent
cases inconsistent with this position 0 A serious trouble with this
criterion, however, is that the antitrust lawyer and the labor lawyer
have very different conceptions of what constitutes price fixing.3 1
Probably the most restrictive interpretation of Allen Bradley sup-
ported by reasonable authority is that the doctrine applies only when
the union is not acting in the interests of its members. This is a clear
misunderstanding; the complex distinctions developed in that case
would be unnecessary if the situation did not involve a "labor dispute'
within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act 2 Many courts,
28 Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 252, 271 (1955). Cox cites for this statement Douds v. Local 28, Sheet Workers
Ass'n, 101 F. Supp. 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) and Dodd, The Supreme Court and Or-
ganized Labor, 1941-1945, 58 HARv. L. REv. 1018, 1051 (1945). In neither of these
sources, however, is the possibility of implying a conspiracy considered.
29 In the Allen Bradley opinion there is at least one, and sometimes several
references to price fixing and production control or elimination of competition on
each page of the opinion from page 808 through page 811. 325 U.S. at 808-811.
30 No union has been convicted under the Allen Bradley doctrine without an
explicit mention of direct price fixing as one of the elements of the offense. See, e.g.,
Local 175, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v.
United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
31The antitrust lawyer has come to regard price fixing as including not only a
direct setting of price by agreement among competitors, but a host of less direct
methods aimed at stabilizing prices. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936). Under such a view, even an attempt to stabilize wages might be regarded
as price fixing. The label, therefore, does not solve the problem. See text accom-
panying notes 48-54 infra for a more sophisticated analysis.
32 Section 13(c) of the Norris-La Guardia Act defines "labor dispute" in ex-
tremely broad terms, 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958). Nevertheless,
the courts have sometimes found it necessary to deny the protection of that act (and
of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws) on the ground that there was no "labor
dispute." The simplest case is where a group of employers, acting independently of
the union, seeks to invoke the protection of the labor exemption. United States v.
Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) seems to be this kind of case, at
least in the view of the Supreme Court. The problem becomes more difficult where
one cannot so easily distinguish between a bona fide labor union and an association
of entrepreneurs. Compare Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
283 (1959) and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) and Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) and
Aetna Freight Lines v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
950 (1956) and Mitchell v. Gibbons, 172 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1949) (where the courts
found a labor dispute), with Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143
(1942) and Ring v. Spiner, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) and United States v. Fish
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however, have posed the existence of a labor dispute as the alternative
to Allen Bradley.
3
Thus one can find in the language and the holdings of the cases
interpreting the Allen Bradley doctrine support for almost any posi-
tion. Not only do the cases fail to delineate the exact bases of decision
in the close cases, but even the most extreme positions have strong
support in the language of the opinions. The theories discussed, then,
would seem to err in attempting to extract fine distinctions from these
cases. The approach recommended here is to return to the policy con-
flict posed in the Allen Bradley case and attempt to isolate various sig-
nificant criteria for distinguishing the cases in terms of the overall
policies.
IV. THE Allen Bradley DOCTRINE: UNDERLYING POLICIES AND
FACTORS CALLING FOR ITS APPLICATION
It has been indicated that the Allen Bradley doctrine is a refine-
ment of the accommodation of policies made by exempting labor unions
from the antitrust laws 34 and that this secondary accommodation was
made to cover an obvious loophole whereby employers who cooperated
with unions could use the labor exemption as a shield for their own
schemes. In examining the principles behind the Allen Bradley doc-
trine, then, it is essential to keep in mind first that unions are exempt
from the antitrust laws, and second, that the purpose of the Allen
Bradley refinement is to prevent employers from availing themselves
of the labor exemption.
Clearly, the doctrine must involve some employer benefit. More-
over, since almost all union activity benefits some employers, the bene-
Smokers Trade Council, 183 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (where they found none).
The distinctions made are not very satisfying, and the problem requires a good deal
of rethinking. The area, although important, is peripheral to our main interest, i.e.,
limitations on acknowledged bona fide labor unions.
Another area of confusion is represented by Bakery Sales Drivers Local v.
Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948) and American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d
679 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954). In both cases the courts ruled
that the Norris-La Guardia Act did not apply to the activities of an unquestionably
bona fide labor union since there was no labor dispute. They implied that the union
as an entity had no disagreement with the employers, but that certain leaders of the
union were out to "get" the employers involved. This is never dearly stated, how-
ever, and the idea seems to conflict with the decision in Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S.
821 (1945), in which a union was allowed to put a partnership out of business even
though the union activity was the result of personal antagonism arising from the
shooting of one of the union members. This undefined doctrine has great potential
significance, since it could restore the era before Norris-La Guardia and Hutcheson
when courts were free to pass upon union objectives. Since only two such cases could
be found, however, and these are infrequently cited, their facts were probably extreme.
33 See, e.g., Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46, 55 (8th Cir.
1958); California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957). But see United
States v. Milk Drivers Union, 153 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1957).
3 4 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
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fits involved must be something more than the incidental employer
benefit from normal trade union activity. In other words, the benefit
must arise from the normal commercial interests of the employer, not
from the fact of union organization.
Once an employer has been organized, he has a whole new con-
geries of interests arising out of the situation. He would like to see
other employers organized, paying union wages, and complying with
a union shop. If this kind of employer interest brought a case within
the Allen Bradley doctrine, there would be little left of the labor ex-
emption. The Allen Bradley type of situation involves more than
incidental employer benefit; the union in pursuing its own goals may
be expected to be seeking to assure employer cooperation by furthering
the employers' monopolistic ambitions.
It should also be noted that the determination as to whether a
particular case comes within the Allen Bradley doctrine must be made
by examining the economic realities underlying the formal arrange-
ments. A demand for higher wages may be a tool for enabling em-
ployers to circumvent the antitrust laws, 5 while apparent price fixing
may upon examination be no more than a legitimate exercise of union
power."6 Interpretation of the Allen Bradley doctrine must be realistic
and flexible in order to preserve the labor exemption without under-
mining the basic structure of the antitrust laws. Were courts to focus
on form, unions and employers could circumvent the doctrine by hav-
ing the union phrase its demands in terms of normal trade union
goals; on the other hand, unions might be prevented from using the
most effective method of seeking their legitimate goals in situations
where the formal arrangements had the appearance of a per se
violation."
Although a good flexible rule cannot be expressed in terms of a
fixed set of standards to be mechanically applied, certain criteria rele-
vant to a decision under the Allen Bradley doctrine can be gleaned
from the cases and the economic situations involved.
A. Economic Effects of the Conspiracy
While not every economic effect is sufficient to bring a union
within the Allen Bradley doctrine, the Allen Bradley case itself indi-
cated that certain economic results are indicative of the kind of con-
35 See Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
86 See California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957).
37 See discussion of California Sportswear case, notes 51-53 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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spiracy which falls within the doctrine." Subsequent cases suggest
that a violation may be found if the action taken eliminates a particular
unwanted competitor, provides a barrier to new entry, or substan-
tially reduces the vigor of competition among the management groups
involved. While in particular situations such economic effects may
be no more than the by-products of legitimate union activity, without
them there is lacking the element of employer benefit which is the first
requisite to a finding of union action shielding management violation.
1. Elimination of Competitors and Establishment of Barriers to Entry
A barrier to entry can result as easily from legitimate trade union
activity as from an attempt to shield employers in the exercise of
monopoly power. 9 Unions eliminate competitors every day because
of failure to meet union standards. In the Musicians 40 and Hod Car-
riers41 cases, whole industries were shut out from certain markets by
the elimination of labor saving devices. Nevertheless, when there is a
genuine union interest involved, such effects do not bring the case
within the Allen Bradley doctrine.4
When, however, the elimination of a competitor or the creation
of a barrier to entry is the sole motive for the union's action-the al-
leged union interest being only a sham-courts will find an antitrust
violation. In Philadelphia Recording Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-
Engravers Assn,43 the court granted an injunction, finding it perfectly
clear that the union prevented plaintiff from doing night work, not
because the union felt that this was in the interest of its members,
but because of pressure from the employers' association. In Anderson-
Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son,' the union effectively ex-
cluded from the New York market Vermont fabricators whose wages
and conditions of employment did not meet New York standards. The
court ruled that the activity was protected if the union was doing it in
38 The Court in Allen Bradley repeatedly stressed the price-fixing and production
control aspects of the conspiracy. The Court noted that independent union action
might have resulted in higher prices and individual refusals to deal without violating
the antitrust laws. 325 U.S. at 809-11. The Court never stated, however, that inde-
pendent union action directed to price fixing and production control would be legal.
In any event, it would seem to be a fair interpretation of the opinion that price fixing
and production control are at least indicative of a possible violation.
S9 For example, a union-established wage rate may pose a barrier to entry to
employers who cannot afford to meet that wage.
40 United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill.
1942), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943).
41United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curain sub
nor. United States v. International Hod Carriers Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).42 In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945), this principle was carried so far
as to allow the union to eliminate an employer from competition because of personal
animosity.
43 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946).
44 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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the interest of its members, but was a violation if the union was merely
helping a group of employers achieve monopoly power. Finally, in
Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co.,45 the court found a cause
of action in an allegation that the union was demanding a new wage
schedule solely to drive plaintiff out of business because his efficient
methods were hurting the employer association; but the jury found
for the union, presumably on the ground that the union was seeking
the new wage schedule in the interest of its members.4"
This category of violation must, of necessity, be kept extremely
limited. Almost anything a union does can tend to hurt a competing
employer or to bar entry by others. To find a violation whenever
union activity has an economic effect of this sort might destroy the
labor exemption. But to allow unions to help employers drive un-
wanted competitors out of the market would dangerously undermine
the antitrust laws. The distinction between these two types of situa-
tions depends upon union intent. Since the Allen Bradley doctrine
is an exception to a general legislative policy of exempting unions from
the antitrust laws, courts should be slow to brand the stated union
objective a "sham" or "pretext." 47
2. Price Fixing
Price fixing by unions has been one of the major concerns of
those who advocate greater restraint upon unions through application
of the antitrust laws. Increased regulation of direct union control of
prices in the product market has received widespread support.48 The
appeal of this formula, however, rests upon its deceptive simplicity. If
the cases were reduced to specific fact situations, there no doubt would
be wide disagreement as to the application of the formula to each.
To the antitrust lawyer price fixing means more than a direct
agreement among competitors to charge the same price and might well
include an attempt to standardize wages throughout an industry.49
Clearly this is not the kind of "price fixing" which makes a union
suspect under the Allen Bradley doctrine. A rise in wages and a
45 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
46 See note 20 supkra.
47 The small number of cases decided under this theory would seem to indicate
that it has not been abused.
48 See INDEPENDENT STUDY GROUP FOR THE CoMmIrEE FREcoNo Ic DEVELOP-
MENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1961). The Study Group
suggests that further legislation is necessary to curb direct union control of prices
and production but indicates that such legislation should not be within the framework
of the antitrust laws. Considering the makeup of the Study Group, this suggestion
tends to reinforce my own observations that the desire for further legislation con-
cerning this problem has spread far beyond those persons who might be considered
anti-union.
49 See note 31 supra.
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betterment of working conditions may occasion a rise in prices or a
decrease in production, but the cases decided under Allen Bradley
clearly state that some sort of direct and substantial employer benefit
is necessary to a finding of violation.50 These cases emphasize such
overt aspects of employer conspiracy as price fixing, rigged bidding,
and division of territory. These elements alone do not delineate the
area of unprotected union activity but they are indicative of the kind
of economic effect that courts look for to find a violation-the type of
substantial elimination of competition that would result from an agree-
ment among competitors to maintain a particular price or to refrain
from competing with each other for orders.
A good illustration of this distinction is the California Sportswear
case " which concerned protected activity very close to the line of
violation. The case involved a collective bargaining agreement which
required clothing manufacturers to pay for all contract work done, an
amount sufficient to cover union wages plus a reasonable amount for
overhead. Had the employers on their own joined in such an agree-
ment, it would have been branded price fixing. Nevertheless, the
opinion of the hearing examiner states categorically: "There is no
evidence in the record to show that the provisions of the agreement
relating to payment of contractors has resulted in any price fixing
. ,, . The opinion then analyzes the situation:
The agreements provide for the payment to the contractor
of a "reasonable amount" for his overhead. However, there
is no agreement among the employer associations fixing this
amount. On the contrary, the record establishes that the
amount of such overhead is a matter for individual bargain-
50 This conclusion is a result more of an examination of the facts and holdings
of the cases than of the explicit language. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940) (dictum), the Court stated that elimination by the union
of competition among employers based on wages and working conditions did not
violate the Sherman Act. Since then, however, this point seems more taken for
granted than explicitly stated. Almost all of the cases decided under Allen Bradley
involved a substantial disruption of commerce and a benefit to some employer group,
yet the Court never found these elements alone sufficient to support a finding of
violation. In United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D.
Ill. 1942), aff'd per curian, 318 U.S. 741 (1943) and United States v. Carrozzo, 37
F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curian; sib nor. United States v. International
Hod Carriers Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941), whole industries were eliminated from
competition in certain markets to the benefit of competitor employers, but the Supreme
Court upheld findings of no violation. In Davis Pleating & Button Co. v. California
Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956), the court found no
employer benefit in the elimination of non-union contractors. In Anderson-Friberg,
Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son, 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), elimination of Ver-
mont competitors and benefit to New York producers was obvious, yet the deter-
mination of violation turned upon whether the union was acting in its self-interest.
See also discussion of California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957)
notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text.
5154 F.T.C. 835 (1957).
52 Id. at 870.
1106 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110:1094
ing between each jobber or manufacturer and his contractors.
Not only is there no evidence of any uniformity of price
among contractors, but there is affirmative credible testimony
that the prices charged by a given group of contractors pro-
ducing the same style garment for the same jobber actually
differ.53
This demonstrates that the courts look for price uniformity, not merely
price rise, and decreased competition, not merely decreased production.
These are results that employer groups would seek if they were to
conspire without the union. Employer benefit under Allen Bradley
is not merely a by-product of normal trade union objectives.
Even union-induced price uniformity may not, in all instances, be
indicative of possible violation of the Allen Bradley doctrine. Price
uniformity may result from legitimate trade union activity if the prod-
uct market is oligopolistic. Also, certain prices may be so clearly re-
lated to wages that the union should have a right to control them to
prevent the undermining of the union scale.
Companies in an oligopolistic industry tend in any case toward
uniform price policy. If costs are standardized price uniformity be-
comes more likely. Since labor costs are an element of total cost, the
imposition of uniform labor standards will reinforce this tendency.
Were such an effect to subject the union to antitrust prosecution, col-
lective bargaining would be a dead letter in oligopolistic industries. In
such circumstances the union is not using its exemption to protect
management interest but to protect its own interests. The fault, if any,
lies in the market structure which allows only a few employers to
dominate the industry.
It has been argued that certain prices are so closely related to wage
rates that unions must be able to control them in order to control
wages. There is some authority for allowing the union to control
prices when the price is paid directly to an employee and reduction of
the price is a means of undermining the union wage scale. In an
illustrative case, the union was permitted to fix the rates paid for the
rental of trucks driven by the owner because the trucker was in effect
getting a rebate on the union wage scale by paying the owner-driver
less rental for his truck.'
m Ibid.
54 Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). The Oliver
case involved state antitrust laws, rather than federal antitrust laws. The Court's
reasoning that the collective bargaining agreement was obviously fixing wages, not
prices, seems equally applicable to a case brought under the federal antitrust laws.
It has been argued that this principle should be extended to the price charged
by the contractor in the garment trades. The justification for this position is the
"auction block' system by which contractors who are primarily only suppliers of
labor are played off against each other, indirectly driving down wage rates. See
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B. Employer Participation
The Allen Bradley doctrine is concerned with the labor exemption
being used to shelter employer violations from the antitrust laws.
Therefore, the employer participation in a conspiracy found to violate
the antitrust laws under the doctrine must itself amount to a violation
independently. The employer activity must be of the kind that business
interests would be likely to undertake in the absence of the union rather
than mere cooperation with the union in the achievement of typical
union goals.
1. Activity Amounting to a Violation
The employer activity in violation of the antitrust laws may be
a conspiracy among several employers, either express or implied, or
an attempt by a single firm to monopolize the product market with the
aid of the union. The usual method of establishing a violation is to
find an overt conspiracy among the employers. This was the situation
in Allen Bradley-the employers had set up an elaborate price fixing
mechanism which clearly would have been a violation absent union
participation; 55 the same was true of the employer action in most of
the cases based on Allen Bradley.
56
The conspiracy among employers could be implicit as well as
explicit, but no case has yet been brought on a conspiracy theory which
I.L.G.W.U. MONOGRAPH, THE OUTSIDE SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION IN THE WOM S
GARMENT INDUSTRY IN THE NEW YORK MARKET; Brief for Respondent Union, Cali-
fornia Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957). The inequities of the
auction block system were recognized by a special committee appointed by the
Governor of New York to study the problem. GOvERNOR'S ADVISORY COmmISSION,
CLOAK, SUIT AND SKIRT INDUSTRY, NEW YORK CiTY FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
(1926). The special position of the garment trade contractor has also been recognized
in labor legislation. See National Labor Relations Act, 73 Stat. 543-44 (1959), 29
U.S.C.A. § 158(e) (Supp. 1962). So far, however, there has been no specific recog-
nition of a union right to control contractor price, except in the limited circumstances
of the Oliver case, supra, in which the payment was made directly to the employee who
happened incidentally to be a contractor of equipment. See 358 U.S. at 293. The
courts may well be justified in making an exception for the garment industries, but
they should make clear that they are making an exception. Any such exception
should not be allowed to obscure the basic distinction between price fixing and wage
stabilization.
55 "Quite obviously, this combination of businessmen has violated both §§ 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, unless its conduct is immunized by the participation of the
union." 325 U.S. at 800. (Footnote omitted.)
5 6 In Local 175, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States, 219 F.2d 431
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955), and Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers
Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954),
there were elaborate systems of rigged bidding. In Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis
Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958), and in Philadelphia Recording Co. v. Manu-
facturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946), there were charges
that businessmen got together to drive a price cutter out of business. In Jewel Tea
Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 936 (1960), it was charged that employers joined together to block a new
and more efficient form of competition.
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did not involve a number of employers openly acting through an
association. At least one commentator 57 has taken the position that
the employer conspiracy requisite to a finding of violation under Allen
Bradley cannot be implied, but none of his reasons are persuasive. A
conspiracy is "implied" only because the conspirators were careful
enough not to leave any overt evidence; it is no less a conspiracy than
an explicit one. Under Allen Bradley it is just as essential to protect
antitrust policy against covert employer conspiracies hiding behind
the labor exemption as it is to guard against open conspiracies using
the same shield.5"
Two recent cases - hold that the employer violation which the
union aids and abets can be an attempt to monopolize under section
2 of the Sherman Act as well as a section 1 conspiracy. In both cases
it was alleged that the unions made costly demands upon all employers
except a favored few. In one case, the favored employers attained a
considerable degree of monopoly power, and in both cases it was al-
leged that the business of the defendants had been considerably in-
creased at the expense of the complainants. Extension of this doctrine
to such cases is appropriate. It is just as important to prevent the
use of the labor exemption to foster monopoly as to foster conspiracy.
2. Business Activity in the Absence of Union Organization
To justify application of the Allen Bradley doctrine the employer
interest must also be such that the business participants would be likely
to pursue absent the union. There must be more than the elimination
of competition caused by ordinary union demands. Dictum to this
effect in the Apex case o is supported by the findings of no violation
57 Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 252 (1955).
58 The corollary of this point is also true. The fact that agreement among em-
ployers is expressed does not mean that there is an employer conspiracy within the
meaning of the Allen Bradley doctrine. Otherwise, all wage negotiations through an
association would be illegal. Whether the courts will extend the doctrine of implied
conspiracy as far in this area of the law as it has been extended in other areas is
another problem. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27
(1939), the Court implied a conspiracy from individual agreements to participate
in a plan with knowledge that competitors were agreeing to the same plan. The
courts may be reluctant to extend such a theory to the area of labor relations, since
this might result in branding industry-wide collective bargaining demands as illegal
conspiracies. However, such an extension may be justified where the result of
acceding to the demand is price fixing in the narrow sense in which we have defined
it above.
-5 United States v. Bitz, 179 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v.
Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
60 310 U.S. at 503-04. Actually the holding in Apex was based upon a finding
that the union action involved had no effect at all on the market price of the goods
being produced.
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in the Hod Carriers6' and Musicians ' cases, in which competition
was greatly reduced by the elimination of labor saving devices with
the cooperation of employers. In a case involving agreements to deal
only with unionized contractors, the court found no violation on the
ground that the agreement afforded no benefit to the employers.13 This
could only have meant no benefit of the kind contemplated by the
Allen Bradley doctrine, since many of the employers involved gained
protection from low wage competition. Finally, in the California
Sportswear case,6 the FTC found that a scheme sponsored by the
union and joined by employer groups that put a floor under prices was
not illegal price fixing because it had no more economic effect than that
usually incident to standardization of wages and working conditions.
In all of the above cases the activity would have amounted to a
clear violation of the antitrust laws had the employers acted alone.
With the labor exemption involved, however, something more was re-
quired. No violation was found because the economic effect was no
more than that normally incident to standardization of wages and
working conditions. It was not the kind of activity which the em-
ployers would have been likely to undertake in the absence of union
organization.
C. Union Interest
It must be remembered that Allen Bradley was not a limitation
upon union power as such. The doctrine was not designed to reopen
the practice which the Supreme Court had ended with the Hutcheson
case of judicial determination of the legitimacy of labor objectives.
Labor unions, so long as they acted alone and in their own self-interest,
were to be exempt from the application of the antitrust laws. Manage-
ment groups, however, must not be permitted to use the labor exemption
to evade prosecution for their own violations. In distinguishing between
these two prototype situations, the courts look behind the verbal claims
of union and management groups to determine what the parties are
actually seeking to accomplish.
1. Union Interest a Pretext
It would seem clear that labor activity should not be protected
from antitrust sanctions when the union interest alleged is merely a
61 United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam sub
unn., United States v. International Hod Carriers Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).
6 2 United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943).
03 Davis Pleating & Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145
F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
6454 F.T.C. 835 (1957).
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sham. The matter, however, is never so simple. Whatever the pre-
text given by the union for its action, there must have been some basic
motive behind the action taken. If this motive did not somehow relate
to the interests of the union members, there would be no "labor dis-
pute," and the question could be decided without reference to the Allen
Bradley doctrine.6" Accordingly, whenever the Allen Bradley doc-
trine is invoked, the union must be attempting to protect the interests
of its members in some manner which is forbidden. Judicial use of the
terms "sham" and "pretext" to describe the union interest obscures the
true decision that the union's methodology is unlawful.
2. Forbidden Methods of Achieving Union Goals
The interests which unions seek to protect in any labor dispute
are usually much the same. Unions traditionally seek to better wages
and working conditions and to protect the job security of their mem-
bers. Not only is the pursuit of these interests protected, but the union
can generally choose any method it wishes to achieve its goals. The
union can seek to prevent the use of nonunion labor, to put nonunion
employers out of business and to dispense with technological innova-
tions which would reduce the number of employees needed. Under the
Allen Bradley doctrine, however, certain methods of protecting the
interests of union members are prohibited because they involve use
of the labor exemption to protect management schemes that violate the
antitrust laws. These prohibited means of furthering union interests
may be characterized as quid pro quo, mixed objectives, and forbidden
strategy.
In the quid pro quo situation, analytically the simplest of the
three, the union makes an exchange with management; in return for
some union benefit the union will help the employer gain control of
the product market. Very often the employer would be unable to
confer the desired union benefit without achieving some sort of monop-
oly power. The employer, for example, may be unable to pay a higher
wage unless he can extract a higher price. But the Allen Bradley
principle forbids the union to further the interests of its members by
helping an employer group to gain monopoly power in a product
market. The quid pro quo concept is illustrated by Local 75, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. United States,66 and Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers v. United States. 67 Both cases involved a non-competitive
allocation of contracts and rigged bidding. Convictions of criminal
65 See note 32 smpra.
66219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
67210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
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conspiracy were upheld without discussion of what benefit the unions
expected, signifying that an employer's help to the union as a quid pro
quo does not justify this kind of union-employer scheme. Similarly,
in United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States,6 8 a cause of action
was found in an allegation that the union had contracted to help the
management association achieve a local monopoly in return for higher
wages. The union in the Allen Bradley case provided the employers
with both a sheltered market 6' and a scheme for price control within
that market. The ultimate goal of the union in these cases was to
help its members; otherwise there would have been no "labor dispute"
and no Allen Bradley issue. The courts focused on the union's means
which benefited the employer and ignored the end of furthering union
interests. This implies that certain methods of helping union
members are not to be protected; specifically, the union may not help
the employer gain monopoly power in the product market notwith-
standing concomitant satisfaction of union demands.
The mixed objectives situation is a variation of the quid pro quo.
Here the union has deliberately chosen an illegal, in preference to an
available legal, means to the union objective in order to confer an anti-
competitive benefit upon the employer and thus insure his support. The
Allen Bradley case is the best illustration. The Court recognized that
the union might have achieved the same results through legitimate col-
lective bargaining with each of the employers. Instead the union chose
to enter an elaborate conspiracy that included price fixing machinery
in order to make the total scheme more palatable to the employers.
Allen Bradley held that a union may not offer inducements to man-
agement which are the sort of anti-competitive arrangements which the
employers would be likely to seek on their own accord.
"Forbidden strategy" refers to achieving union goals by methods
that have such inevitable anti-competitive efforts that unions are not
free to choose them, even if they have no intention of aiding manage-
ment. A union may, for example, seek to protect the job security of its
members by limiting the entry of new firms into the industry. The
argument for applying the Allen Bradley doctrine in these situations
is that the employer benefits involved are precisely the kind which the
employers would seek independently. However, such an application
of the doctrine would interfere with union strategy in situations in
which the union is not seeking to foster management interests. The
courts have avoided decision of this. issue by finding either that the
union's real purpose is to benefit a group of employers or that there
6 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
69 The term "sheltered market" is used in this Article to denote a local market
in which local producers are protected from outside competition.
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was no antitrust violation at all. Dictum in Allen Bradley indicates
that the union might be able to seal off a market through parallel agree-
ments with individual employers without violating the antitrust laws.7"
To date, however, no case has explicitly upheld the right of a union to
exclude all new employers from a product market. Theoretically, the
courts could decide either way, but the issue may be rendered moot by
the enforcement of the secondary boycott provisions of the labor law."'
Unions have traditionally achieved sheltered markets through sec-
ondary boycotts and hot cargo clauses. In the Allen Bradley case, the
union was able to control the market by refusing to install any equip-
ment not manufactured by its members." In many other cases in-
volving the doctrine, the union used its power over local contractors to
exclude out-of-state equipment and supplies.73  Under present labor
law, however, a union may not coerce an employer to refuse the prod-
ucts of another nor even secure a binding voluntary agreement from
him to use only union-made products in the future. '  The employer
may voluntarily agree not to use blacklisted products, but the Allen
Bradley doctrine greatly limits the inducements which the union can
offer. And although some employers are likely to respond voluntarily
or through habit to the union's demand, generally this is not likely to
be enough to achieve a sheltered market."5
70 325 U.S. at 809.
71 Sections 8(b)4B and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 73 Stat.
543-44, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. I, 1959). Here again, however, the garment trades
constitute a special case since they are specifically exempted from these provisions.
There is also a narrow exemption for the construction industry. The relation of
these exemptions to the overall pattern of judicial abstention from the "forbidden
objective" type of case is not clear. There is no developed doctrine of preemption,
but there is a judicial reluctance to enter an area where the antitrust doctrine is of
questionable applicability, if the problem can be handled adequately by the labor law.
Nevertheless, it would be an obvious frustration of congressional intent in making
these exemptions if the industries were thereby subjected to greater antitrust prose-
cutions.
-72325 U.S. at 799-800.
'3 See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947);
United States v. Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Anderson-
Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son, 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
74 Clearly, a union attempt to secure employer cooperation by offering price
control as part of the overall scheme would invoke the Allen Bradley doctrine.
75 It will be interesting to observe the developing application of labor law to
this type of situation. National Labor Relations Board General Counsel Stuart
Rothman has indicated that he intends to use section 8(e) in restraint of trade
situations. NLRB Press Release No. R-823, December 4, 1961. This situation,
however, is not the sheltered market situation discussed here, but rather an attempt
by the union to limit the replacement of employees, by so-called independent con-
tractors who serve the same economic function as employees. The better reasoning
on the antitrust implications of this sort of case would seem to be that the union, in
attempting to prevent the undermining of wages and conditions by hiring what are
essentially low-wage employees, is engaging in protected activity. See Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940). But cf.
United States v. Milk Drivers Union, 153 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1957). Of
course if bona fide independent contractors were involved, there would be no labor
dispute under the Norris-La Guardia Act, and the union would clearly be subject to
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The concept of forbidden strategy would aggravate the problem
of judicial regulation of labor relations through the antitrust laws.
The union would be subject to prosecution, not because it sought to
further its goals by assisting employers, but simply because the methods
it chose inevitably led to monopoly. These methods have been strongly
criticized even within the labor movement.76  However, it is probably
best that this sort of union activity should be regulated, if at all,
through the labor law, rather than the antitrust laws, since manage-
ment interests are only incidentally involved. The secondary boycott
and hot cargo provisions of the labor law have already substantially
retarded the use of these techniques to achieve union goals. As unions
become more accustomed to these limitations in the labor law, they
hopefully will abandon the sheltered market methodology of union
activity.
V. PATTERNS OF ANTITRUST VIOLATION
The many factors to be considered in determining whether there
has been a violation under Allen Bradley are interrelated. In terms
of these factors, violations of the antitrust laws may be placed into one
of two categories: first, instances in which the union helps an indi-
vidual employer or a group of employers obtain some degree of control
over the supply and/or price of a product in a particular market; and
second, when the union aids an employer group by coercing or elim-
inating a particular competitor who is regarded as a trouble maker by
the others.
The first of these two categories is exemplified by the Allen Brad-
ley case and a number of cases decided under it. The type of benefit
offered to the conspiring employers is a market sheltered from outside
competition and yielding relative price uniformity among included
competitors. The union may have regarded this as an essential quid
pro quo for a union benefit, or it may have deliberately chosen a more
antitrust prosecution. See cases cited note 33 mupra. In any event, the labor pro-
visions would be applicable to the sheltered market situation, if the General Counsel
should desire to attempt to correct this situation through the labor law. But see
note 79 infra and accompanying text.
Section 8(e) provides only a very limited damage remedy, available only in the
unusual case in which a secondary boycott is used to enforce a hot cargo provision.
This limitation is probably not serious, however, since a study of the cases indicates
that a demand for damages against a union under the antitrust laws is extremely
rare, if not totally non-existent. The usual remedy sought is injunction.
7 6 Usually these cases involve not merely an attempt to preserve union standards,
but a scheme for preserving the jobs of the members of a local union-often at the
expense of members of other unions or even members of other locals of the same
international union-by securing a local monopoly for their employers. A number
of union officials have indicated privately that they would not be unhappy at the
elimination of this sort of practice, although they would prefer it to be accomplished
by private action within the labor movement.
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anti-competitive approach in preference to other possible means in order
to secure the support of the employers involved. This pattern accounts
for the great majority of violations found under Allen Bradley.
The second pattern is typified by such cases as the Philadelphia
Recording Co. case.77 The benefit to the employer is the elimination
of an undesirable competitor, often a price cutter. There is no measur-
able effect upon prices or level of production, although the elimination
of the price cutter may well forestall a general lowering of prices. The
union is not directly interested in eliminating or coercing the particular
competitor, but it does so either to maintain a good relationship with
the other employers or to secure some particular benefit which the
employers are willings to offer.
Although these two models are relatively simple to understand in
theory, the problems of classification may be very great. The dis-
tinction between price fixing and standardization of wages and work-
ing conditions is relatively clear conceptually, but often the factual
situations defy line-drawing. When prices are so closely related to
wages that a union may control them 1 the analysis assumes another
complex dimension. Similarly, the concept of a union helping a man-
agement group to eliminate an unwanted competitor is easy to state,
but to distinguish between a conspiracy to eliminate a competitor and
such elimination which occurs as the by-product of legitimate trade
union activity may be extremely difficult in practice.
VI. LABOR LAW AND ANTITRUST LAW
It has already been suggested 79 that in some cases the more diffi-
cult doctrinal problems of applying the antitrust laws to labor unions
might be solved by labor law. It may occur to some parties who
attempt to extend this reasoning that section 8(b) (4) and 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act have indeed rendered moot the whole
issue of the Allen Bradley doctrine. Not only is this untrue, but the
two sets of laws may well prove complementary; the labor law is
primarily directed to situations in which cooperation is secured by the
use of economic force, while the antitrust laws are primarily concerned
with situations in which employer cooperation is secured by offering
monopolistic inducements. Since these sections apply only when the
union has to use strike or threat of strike in support of its goals, they
would come into play when employers refuse to cooperate voluntarily
in the scheme. The union may attempt to set up a sheltered market
77 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946).
78 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
79 See notes 71-76 supra and accompanying text.
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in an area where the employers involved are so small, fragmented, and
highly competitive that to the individual employer, the benefit from
the overall scheme would be negligible. Or the union may be so strong
that it would take all the monopoly profits for itself. In such cases,
8(b) (4) and 8(e) could hardly be said to preempt the area regulated
by the antitrust laws, but rather would fill a gap where the application
of those laws would be considered, at least highly questionable. True,
these cases are extreme, but there are elements of them in any situation
in which the union uses economic power to persuade employers to
accept its scheme. Sections 8(b) (4) and 8(e) are primarily appli-
cable to those elements of the overall scheme to which the Allen Brad-
ley doctrine would not apply.
On the other hand, the Allen Bradley doctrine relates to situations
in which employer cooperation is consensual. When an employer vol-
untarily agrees to stop trading with another employer, sections 8 (b) (4)
and 8(e) are inapplicable. Thus, if in the Allen Bradley case all local
manufacturers had voluntarily agreed with all the local contractors, on
urging of the union, that they would deal only with each other, these
sections would be inapplicable to the scheme. True, in most situations
there will usually be a few mavericks who will not go along. The
law may well prefer, however, to destroy the entire scheme, including
its voluntary elements, by invoking the antitrust laws through the
Allen Bradley doctrine, rather than merely to chip away at the scheme
by protecting those who choose not to cooperate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Allen Bradley is an attempt to resolve a problem which naturally
occurs when one group is allowed to use economic power in a way for-
bidden to another group: how to prevent the group permitted to use
the power from selling it to the other group. The problem is com-
plicated in the Allen Bradley-type situation by the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between the cases in which the union is seeking to help
the employer, and those in which it is seeking only its own benefit;
most union actions benefit some employers, and in most cases some
justification can be found for union action in terms of labor objectives.
In previous attempts to define the Allen Bradley doctrine, courts,
advocates, and commentators have adopted various interpretations.
The courts have been preoccupied with highly conceptual formulations
and have failed to state precise criteria applicable to particular fact
situations. Advocates and commentators, on the other hand, have fre-
quently attempted to apply these conceptual statements as if they
were precise formulations of criteria. The resultant variation in
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theories depends upon which particular language was chosen as most
significant.
In place of this emphasis upon language, I have suggested both
a different approach and a different set of solutions. The approach
is to reexamine the nature of the accommodation made by Allen
Bradley and then to judge specific fact situations, not in terms of
judicial statements, but in terms of the nature and purpose of the
Allen Bradley distinction. The problem of deciding cases under Allen
Bradley thus becomes one of balancing the factors which I have cate-
gorized broadly as economic effect, employer participation, and union
interest. Certain factors, such as price uniformity, are indicative of
likely antitrust violation, and these factors often group themselves into
patterns of violation. These patterns generally follow one of two
models, either the sheltered market situation of the Allen Bradley case,
or the elimination of a cut-rate competitor as in the Philadelphia Re-
cording Co. case. Both models present their own problems. In the
sheltered market situation the economic effects must be closely
scrutinized to determine whether marginal competitors are being ex-
cluded by the imposition of labor union standards or whether em-
ployers are being sheltered from all competition. When a particular
competitor is eliminated, union interest must be scrutinized to deter-
mine whether the elimination was only an accidental by-product of
legitimate union activity.
This analysis does not solve all of the theoretical and practical
problems. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this Article has established
a useful framework for presenting and evaluating the varying points
of view so that disagreements will no longer be voiced in terms of
verbal formulations which ignore the policy bases of the Allen Bradley
decision.
